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CIVIL RIGHTS—EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION:
WHAT LEDBETTER MEANS FOR EMPLOYEES FACING
GENDER-BASED PAY DISCRIMINATION
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007)
I.

FACTS

Lilly Ledbetter was employed by Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in
Gadsden, Alabama.1 Ledbetter worked as an area manager, supervising a
group of tire builders.2 One of four business center managers supervised
the area managers.3 Early each year, the business center managers recommended salary increases for each of the salaried employees supervised,
including the area managers.4 Each business center manager completed a
worksheet, called a merit increase plan, using performance rankings and
guidelines regarding the size and frequency of merit-based salary
increases.5 These merit increase plans required approval from upper-level
management before they went into effect.6
Ledbetter began her career at the Gadsden plant in 1979, when she was
forty years old.7 The plant laid her off twice, once in 1986 and again in
1989.8 In 1992, Ledbetter began working in the Radial Light Truck section
of the Tire Assembly business center, which produced radial tires for sport
utility vehicles and light trucks.9 Her business center manager, Mike
Tucker, consistently ranked her performance at or near the bottom of the
employees he supervised.10
In 1993, she was ranked third out of four area managers in her department and fifth out of six salaried employees.11 That year, Tucker suggested
that she receive a 5.28% salary increase, which was the largest increase
among the area managers by percentage but the smallest in absolute

1. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007).
2. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1172 (11th Cir. 2005).
3. Id. at 1171.
4. Id. at 1172.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1173.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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dollars.12 In 1994, Ledbetter was ranked last among area managers and
salaried employees.13 She received a 5% salary increase, the smallest of
any salaried employee.14 In 1995, however, Ledbetter earned a higher
performance rating.15 She received an individual performance award and a
top performance award, which resulted in a 7.85% salary increase.16 In
1996, she was unable to receive a salary increase because of a time restriction related to the date on which she received her 1995 increase.17
However, her performance rankings were low once again.18 Tucker ranked
her fifteenth out of sixteen area managers and twenty-third out of twentyfour salaried employees.19
In 1997, Ledbetter was making $3727 per month, which was 15%
lower than the lowest paid male area manager and 40% lower than the
highest paid male area manager.20 Her business center manager, Mike
Tucker, was replaced by Kelly Owen.21 Owen ranked her performance as
twenty-third out of twenty-four salaried employees and fifteenth out of
sixteen area managers. Owen denied her a raise.22
Ledbetter complained of sexual harassment and sex discrimination.23
Prior to 1998, she complained of treatment she received from a supervisor,
Mike Maudsley.24 Ledbetter claimed that Maudsley threatened to give her
a bad performance evaluation if she was not receptive to his sexual
advances.25 Maudsley later allegedly falsified Ledbetter’s performance
audits.26 Ledbetter continued to spurn Maudsley’s advances, and her
evaluation rating became progressively worse.27 The audits conducted by
Mike Maudsley were the basis of the denial of a raise for Ledbetter in

12. Id. Ledbetter’s increase was lowest in absolute dollars because the male area managers
obtained higher salaries. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1173-74.
18. Id. at 1174.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1175.
23. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct.
2162 (2007) (No. 05-1074).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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1997.28 Ledbetter believed these actions constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.29
In 1998, Ledbetter took a non-supervisory position as a technology
engineer.30 On March 25 of that year, she filed a questionnaire with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), stating that she had
received disparate treatment in her new department on account of her sex
and had been forced to take a technology engineer position.31 In July of
1998, she filed a formal discrimination charge with the EEOC, which
included her earlier complaints, as well as a complaint that she had received
a lower salary as an area manager on account of her sex.32
In August of 1998, Goodyear announced that it would be downsizing
the Gadsden plant and gave employees the option to choose early retirement
rather than be laid off.33 Ledbetter opted for early retirement and retired on
November 1, 1998.34 She filed suit against Goodyear over one year later.35
On November 24, 1999, Ledbetter filed multiple claims in the Northern
District of Alabama against Goodyear for violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act (EPA), and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act.36 The jury considered four claims, one of disparate
pay based on gender and three of age discrimination related to her transfer
to the Technology Engineer position.37 The jury found for Goodyear on the
age discrimination claims and for Ledbetter on the disparate pay claim.38
The court awarded Ledbetter $223,776 in back pay, $4662 for mental
anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive damages.39 The district court denied a
motion for judgment as a matter of law from Goodyear, but reduced the
jury award to $360,000, which consisted of $300,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages and $60,000 in back pay, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.40
Goodyear appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.41
28. Id.
29. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005).
30. Id. at 1174.
31. Id. at 1175.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1175 n.7 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(d), 621-34 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2000)).
37. Id. at 1175.
38. Id. at 1175-76.
39. Id. at 1176.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of judgment as
a matter of law in favor of Goodyear.42 The Eleventh Circuit held that
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan 43 governed the issue, and that
Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim was a claim alleging a discrete act of
discrimination.44 Because EEOC charges are time-sensitive, Ledbetter
could only challenge discrete acts of discrimination that took place within
180 days before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire on March 25, 1998. 45
The only pay decision during this period was Ledbetter’s denial of a raise
by Kelly Owen, based on her 1997 performance review.46 The Eleventh
Circuit found that no reasonable jury could find that this act was discriminatory.47 The Eleventh Circuit rejected Ledbetter’s argument, holding that
issuing paychecks based on prior discrimination does not constitute a
continuing act of discrimination.48 Because the pay decisions that took
place within 180 days before the filing of the EEOC questionnaire were not
discriminatory, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed her complaint with
prejudice.49
Ledbetter then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether a plaintiff could bring a Title VII pay discrimination claim when
the disparate pay was received during the statutory charging period, but was
the result of discriminatory pay decisions that were made outside the
charging period.51 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ledbetter’s
claims were time-barred.52
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court considered Ledbetter’s claim under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.53 Ledbetter analogized her Title VII claim to
claims under a number of other statutes, including the Equal Pay Act

42. Id. at 1189-90.
43. 536 U.S. 101 (2002) [hereinafter Amtrak v. Morgan].
44. Ledbetter, 421 F.3d at 1179-80.
45. Id. at 1178.
46. Id. at 1180.
47. Id. at 1184.
48. Id. at 1182.
49. Id. at 1189-90.
50. Brief of Ledbetter at *8-9, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 S. Ct. 2965
(2006) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 448515.
51. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 S. Ct. 2965, 2965 (2006), cert. granted,
74 U.S.L.W. 3713 (June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1074).
52. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177 (2007).
53. Id. at 2165.
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(EPA), the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).54 A greater understanding of the statutes cited in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.55 may be helpful to understand
the Court’s decision.56 The Supreme Court has also previously addressed
legal concepts considered by the Ledbetter Court, including discrete acts of
discrimination, unlawful employment practices, and the EEOC charging
period.57 Knowledge of these decisions is essential to understanding the
decision of the Ledbetter Court.
A. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
On July 2, 1964, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.58 The
purpose of the act was:
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction
upon the district courts of the United States to provide injunctive
relief against discrimination in public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect constitutional
rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally
assisted programs, to establish a Commission on Equal
Employment Opportunity, and for other purposes.59
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made employment discrimination
on the basis of sex illegal, including discrimination related to compensation.60 Title VII also created the EEOC.61
The EEOC is charged with investigating and redressing claims of
employment discrimination.62 Title VII originally mandated that a charge
of employment discrimination be filed with the EEOC within ninety days of
its occurrence.63 If the employer has not complied with the EEOC’s efforts
to end the discrimination within thirty days of the filing of an EEOC

54. Id. at 2176-77.
55. 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007).
56. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166-67 (discussing Title VII).
57. See, e.g., Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (listing discrete acts of discrimination); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (identifying
each paycheck issued under a racially discriminatory system as an actionable instance of employment discrimination).
58. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. at 255.
61. Id. § 705, 78 Stat. at 258.
62. Id. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259.
63. Id. § 706(d), 78 Stat. at 260.
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charge, the claimant may then file suit.64 In 1972, Title VII was amended to
extend the 90 day filing period to 180 days.65 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 also amended the Title VII section dealing with
the remedies available to the EEOC.66 These remedies include enjoining
the employer from engaging in the unlawful employment practice, reinstating the employee with or without back pay, and any other equitable
relief the court sees fit.67 The time for which an employee can receive back
pay is limited to two years before the filing of the charge with the EEOC. 68
Employee wages are also regulated by the FLSA.69
B. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938
The FLSA, passed as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal
legislation, was enacted on June 25, 1938.70 Its purpose was to establish
“fair labor standards in employments in and affecting interstate commerce.”71 The FLSA regulates employee wages.72 The FLSA mandates the
minimum wages employees must be paid and maximum hours that they
may work.73 Unlike Title VII, employees seeking to state a claim under the
FLSA face a two year statute of limitations.74 The FLSA did not originally
bar gender-based pay discrimination, but it was later amended to do so.75
C. THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963
Congress amended the FLSA when it passed the EPA on June 10,
1963.76 Its purpose was to “prohibit discrimination on account of sex in the
payment of wages by employers engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce.”77 The EPA bars gender-based pay discrimination.78 The EPA prohibited employers engaged in interstate commerce

64. Id. § 706(e), 78 Stat. at 260.
65. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 105
(1972). The filing period is 300 days if there is a state agency that also has jurisdiction over the
claim. Id.
66. Id. § 706(g), 86 Stat. at 107.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 255.
75. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56, 56 (1963).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex by paying
employees of one sex lower wages than employees of the opposite sex for
equal work.79 The EPA provided exceptions for differences in wages based
on a seniority system, merit system, commission system, or a factor other
than sex.80 Unlike Title VII, the EPA did not require that a claim be filed
with an agency before action could be taken in court.81 Claims under the
EPA do not face a statute of limitations as limited as claims under Title
VII.82 Title VII bears more similarities to the NLRA.83
D. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
On July 5, 1935, Congress passed another piece of New Deal legislation, the NLRA.84 The purpose of the act was to “diminish the causes of
labor burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce” and to
create the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).85 Similar to Title VII,
the NLRA created an agency to address disputes between employers and
employees.86 The NLRA granted employees the rights “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.”87 The NLRB is charged with effectuating these rights by
promulgating rules and investigating and adjudicating disputes.88 Parties
that are dissatisfied with the NLRB’s decision can appeal to the court of
appeals of the circuit in which the unfair labor practice took place.89
Besides adjudicating disputes over agency decisions, the courts have
defined the parameters and procedures of challenges to unlawful
employment acts.90

79. Id. at 56-57.
80. Id. at 57.
81. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964).
82. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 105
(1972) (mandating that claims be filed with the EEOC within 180 days); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 255(a) (2000) (mandating a two-year statute of limitations for violations, three years for willful
violations).
83. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
84. 49 Stat. at 449.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 3(a), 49 Stat. at 451; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 258
(1964).
87. Id. § 7, 49 Stat. at 452.
88. Id. §§ 6(a), 10(b), 11, 49 Stat. at 452, 453, 455-57.
89. Id. §§ 10(e)-(f), 49 Stat. at 454-55.
90. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55 (1977) (mandating that a
charge be filed within ninety days).
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SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DEFINING UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES AND APPLYING THE EEOC LIMITATIONS PERIOD

The United States Supreme Court has played a role in defining how
employment practices, including wage decisions, are regulated.91 The
Court has decided when particular claims must be filed in order to comply
with EEOC requirements.92 The Court has explained when the EEOC
charging period begins to run.93 It has also defined exactly what does and
does not constitute a discriminatory employment act.94 First, in United Air
Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 95 the Court considered the EEOC charging period.96
1.

United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans

In Evans, an employee could not challenge a current denial of seniority
based on a previous forced resignation.97 Evans was employed by United
Air Lines (United) as a flight attendant.98 United forced her to resign in
1968 because she got married, and at that time United had a policy against
employing married flight attendants.99 This policy was later found to be
unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and United
rehired Evans in 1972.100 However, United treated Evans as a new employee in terms of seniority and benefits.101 Evans filed suit against United,
but the Supreme Court time-barred her claim.102 The Court held that the
seniority system was not being operated in a discriminatory way.103 Also,
Evans lost her opportunity to challenge her forced resignation in 1968
because she did not file a charge with the EEOC within the ninety day time
period.104 The fact that Evans still suffered the effects of her previous
91. See id. (setting guidelines for filing an EEOC charge).
92. Id.
93. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (holding that the EEOC charging
period began to run when the plaintiff was denied tenure, and not when he was terminated).
94. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (including the issuance of paychecks under a discriminatory wage system as a discriminatory
employment act); see also Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989) (holding that
the adoption of discriminatory seniority rules may be challenged, but not the application of those
rules).
95. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
96. Evans, 431 U.S. at 554-55.
97. Id. at 557.
98. Id. at 554.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 554-55 (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)).
101. Id. at 555.
102. Id. at 556-57.
103. Id. at 555.
104. Id. at 559.
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forced resignation was irrelevant.105 The previous discrimination may provide useful background information, but it has no present legal effect.106
Next, the Supreme Court decided when the EEOC charging period would
begin.107
2.

Delaware State College v. Ricks

In Delaware State College v. Ricks,108 the Court faced another
distinction between a discriminatory act and its effects.109 Columbus Ricks,
who emigrated from Liberia, was a professor at Delaware State College
(DSC).110 DSC denied Ricks tenure in March of 1974.111 Instead, DSC
offered him a one year “terminal” contract, which he signed on September
4, 1974.112 Ricks failed to achieve redress through the internal grievance
process and the state employment discrimination system.113 He then filed a
charge with the EEOC on April 28, 1975, for discrimination on the basis of
national origin.114
In a decision that was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, the district
court time-barred Ricks’s claim because he did not file a charge with the
EEOC within 180 days of his denied tenure.115 Ricks argued that his termination on June 30, 1975, at the end of his “terminal” contract along with the
denial of tenure, was a discriminatory act.116 The Court disagreed, however, concluding that the termination was merely an effect of the potentially
discriminatory denial of tenure.117 The Court also concluded that the EEOC
charging period begins to run when the discriminatory act takes place, not
when its effects are suffered.118 Ricks’s Title VII claim was time-barred
because he did not file an EEOC charge within 180 days of when the
discriminatory act, the denial of tenure, took place.119 The Supreme Court
next defined what constitutes a discriminatory employment act.120
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 558.
Id.
Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).
449 U.S. 250 (1980).
Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 252.
Id.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Bazemore v. Friday

In Bazemore v. Friday,121 employees of the North Carolina
Agricultural Extension Service challenged race-based pay discrimination.122
Before 1965, the Extension Service operated two branches: a “white
branch” and a “Negro branch.”123 The African-American employees were
paid less than the white employees.124 This pay disparity continued after
the branches were combined in 1965.125 In 1972, Title VII was made
applicable to state governments as employers.126 The Court held that even
though the pre-1972 acts of discrimination were not actionable, liability
could be imposed for discrimination that was perpetuated after 1972.127
Justice Brennan explained, “[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a
black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title
VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective
date of Title VII.”128 Thus, even though the pay discrimination began
before Title VII was applicable to the Extension Service, the discrimination
that continued after 1972 was actionable.129 The Court later narrowed its
view of actionable employment decisions.130
4.

Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.

In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,131 employees challenged the
provisions of a seniority system.132 Until 1979, all hourly workers at
AT&T’s Montgomery Works plant earned seniority based on the number of
years worked at the plant.133 A worker that was promoted to the position of
“tester” retained the seniority she had previously earned.134 However, in
1979 the company changed the rules for earning seniority.135 Under the
new rules, testers earned seniority based on the amount of time in that

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 386 (per curiam).
Id. at 394 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 396.
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989).
490 U.S. 900 (1989).
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 902.
Id.
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position, not the amount of time worked at the plant.136 At that time, more
women were being promoted to tester positions.137 The women that had
recently been promoted alleged that the new seniority rules were
discriminatory.138 Some female testers filed a complaint with the EEOC in
1983.139 The Court time-barred the claim, because the adoption of the new
seniority rules was the actionable employment act, and this took place
outside the EEOC charging period.140 The Court thus rejected another
claim of a continuing violation of Title VII.141
Congress reacted to this decision.142 Congress amended Title VII in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.143 The amendment classified the following as
unlawful employment practices: when a discriminatory seniority system is
adopted, when an individual becomes subject to it, and when a person is
injured by its application.144 This, in effect, overruled the Court’s holding
in Lorance that only the adoption of the discriminatory seniority system
could be challenged.145 Finally, the Court categorized discriminatory
employment acts.146
5.

Amtrak v. Morgan

In Amtrak v. Morgan, Abner Morgan, Jr., allegedly suffered discrimination when Amtrak refused to allow him to participate in an apprenticeship
program, censured him for absenteeism, used racial epithets against him,
and terminated him for refusing to follow orders.147 Morgan filed claims
with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and the
EEOC, and sued Amtrak for violating Title VII.148 Morgan alleged that he
suffered both discrete acts of discrimination and a hostile work environment.149 The Court held that when challenging a discrete act of discrimination, an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 or 300 days of the

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 903.
139. Id. at 906.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79 (1991)
(amending Title VII to include provisions related to discriminatory seniority systems).
143. Id.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e5(e)(2) (2008).
145. Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906.
146. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 115 (2002).
147. Id. at 105-06 n.1.
148. Id. at 104, 105.
149. Id. at 104.
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occurrence of the act.150 The proper charging period is easily determined
because a discrete act occurs on a particular day.151 These discrete acts
include such decisions as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire.”152 A hostile environment, on the other hand, does
not occur on any particular day.153 It can occur over a long period of time
and can be comprised of a number of acts, not all of which are
actionable.154
When determining whether a hostile work environment exists, courts
look at the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the
conduct; the severity of the conduct; the degree of threat or humiliation; and
whether the interference with the employee’s performance was unreasonable.155 A hostile work environment is actionable as long as one of the acts
that contributes to it takes place during the EEOC charging period.156 The
Court also held that employers could use equitable doctrines such as
waiver, estoppel, equitable tolling, and laches to combat a hostile work
environment claim.157 The Court ultimately remanded Morgan’s claim for
further proceedings.158 In a number of other cases, the Supreme Court
described the elements necessary to make out a claim of disparate
treatment.159
F.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF A
CLAIM OF DISPARATE TREATMENT

The Court has stated that discriminatory intent is an essential element
behind a claim of employment discrimination.160
In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,161 African-American and Latino
workers claimed that their employer and their union discriminated against
them in hiring, promotion, wages, and seniority.162 The claim was a
disparate treatment claim, that African-Americans and Latinos were treated
150. Id. at 110. The EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days if a state agency also has
jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 114.
153. Id. at 115.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 116.
156. Id. at 117.
157. Id. at 121.
158. Id. at 122.
159. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(explaining that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical”).
160. Id.
161. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
162. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
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disparate from whites.163 According to the majority, this is “the most easily
understood type of discrimination.”164 The employees had to prove that
their employer and the union acted with the intent to discriminate.165 The
majority contrasted disparate treatment claims with disparate impact
claims.166 In a disparate impact claim, the claimant does not have to prove
discriminatory intent.167 These claims “involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.”168 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the appellate
court’s decision for the employees.169
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,170 the Court considered another
disparate treatment claim.171 An African-American bank employee filed a
discrimination claim after being rejected for several promotions.172 The
Court held that to make out such a claim, the employee had to prove that
her employer intended to discriminate.173 The appellate court’s decision
was reversed and remanded.174 The district court was directed to review
statistical evidence of discrimination to consider the employee’s claim
under disparate impact theory.175
Thus, in the line of cases preceding Ledbetter, the Supreme Court
decided that an EEOC charge must be filed within the statutory limitations
period following the date of the act itself, not when its effects were
suffered.176 An actionable discriminatory employment act can be described
as either a discrete act, which occurs on a particular day, or a hostile work
environment, which occurs over a period of time.177 Discriminatory pay
has been treated somewhat differently, with each paycheck issued under a
discriminatory pay system beginning its own EEOC charging period.178

163. Id. at 335.
164. Id. at 335 n.15.
165. Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977)).
166. Id. at 336 n.15.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 376-77.
170. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
171. Watson, 487 U.S. at 984.
172. Id. at 982.
173. Id. at 986 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15).
174. Id. at 1000.
175. Id. at 999-1000.
176. Lorance v. AT&T Techs. Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449
U.S. 250, 258 (1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559 (1977).
177. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 115 (2002).
178. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J. concurring).
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III. ANALYSIS
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Justice Alito wrote the
majority opinion for a closely divided Court, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.179 The majority held that
nondiscriminatory acts, such as issuing a paycheck that put prior discriminatory pay decisions into effect, do not begin a new EEOC charging
period.180 Thus, Ledbetter’s claims were not timely.181 Justice Ginsburg
wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer.182
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The question before the Court was:
Whether and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging
illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of intentionally
discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the limitations
period.183
To answer this question, the majority cited Evans, Ricks, and Lorance for
the proposition that an EEOC charging period begins when the discrete act
of discrimination occurs, not when the effects of this act are felt.184 In
addition, a discriminatory act requires not only disparate impact, but also
discriminatory intent.185
Because the allegedly discriminatory pay
decisions took place outside of the EEOC charging period, Ledbetter’s
claims were time-barred.186 In making its decision, the majority first discussed whether the discriminatory intent behind one act can be imputed to a
later act.187 Next, it examined whether pay decisions should be treated

179. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2165 (2007).
180. Id. at 2170 (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)).
181. Id. at 2172 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109).
182. Id. at 2165.
183. Brief of Ledbetter at *i, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 26 S. Ct. 2965
(2006) (No. 05-1074), 2006 WL 448515. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2166 (listing the questions
before the Court).
184. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2167-69 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900,
902-03, 905, 907-08, 911 (1989); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252-54, 257-58 (1980);
United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55, 557-58 (1977)).
185. Id. at 2171.
186. Id. at 2172 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109).
187. Id. at 2167-68 (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 557-58).
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differently from other employment actions under Title VII.188 Finally, the
majority discussed Ledbetter’s policy arguments and analogies to other
statutes.189
1. Prior Discriminatory Intent Cannot be Imputed to a
Subsequent Act
The majority reiterated Title VII’s requirements that to challenge
employment discrimination on the basis of sex, a charge must be filed with
the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory act.190 If a charge is not
filed with the EEOC during this time period, then the discriminatory act
cannot be challenged in court.191 The first step in analyzing an employment
discrimination claim is to specifically identify the employment practices in
question.192
Ledbetter asserted that each of the paychecks she was issued during the
180 days prior to the filing of her charge with the EEOC constituted a
separate act of discrimination.193 She also argued that the 1998 decision to
deny her a raise was discriminatory because it propagated a pay disparity
that was based on prior discriminatory acts.194 The majority asserted that
these acts lack the “central element” of disparate treatment, however, which
is discriminatory intent.195 It also rejected Ledbetter’s contention that prior
discrimination can be “carried forward” by later non-discriminatory acts
that cause the employee to suffer the effects of the prior discrimination.196
In making this determination, the majority found the Court’s prior decisions
in Evans, Ricks, and Lorance instructive.197
The plaintiffs in Evans, Ricks, and Lorance argued that because they
suffered discrimination during the EEOC charging period, their claims were
timely.198 The Ledbetter Court disagreed and rejected such “continuing

188. Id. at 2172. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 386-87 (1986) (holding that pay
discrimination that took place before the EEOC charging period could be challenged).
189. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2176-77 (discussing analogies to other statutes).
190. Id. at 2166 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-5(e)(1) ((2000)).
191. Id. at 2166-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2000)).
192. Id. at 2167 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110-11).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1998); Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977)).
196. Id. at 2169 (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113).
197. Id. at 2167-68 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 907-08 (1989); Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977)).
198. Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257; Evans, 431 U.S. at 577-78).
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discrimination” arguments in each case.199 In Evans, the discriminatory
intent behind the plaintiff’s termination, which took place prior to the
EEOC charging period, could not be imputed to her denial of seniority.200
In Ricks, the discriminatory intent behind the denial of the plaintiff’s tenure
could not be carried over to his termination.201 In Lorance, the discriminatory intent behind the adoption of a new seniority system could not be
connected to benefits that were issued during the EEOC charging period. 202
These decisions show that the proper inquiry in deciding whether an
employment discrimination claim has been timely filed is not when the
effects of discrimination were felt, but when the intentionally discriminatory act took place.203
The majority then looked to a more recent case, Morgan, to determine
what may constitute a discriminatory act in regard to employment.204 A
discrete act that can be challenged as discriminatory is a “single ‘occurrence’ that takes place at a particular point in time,” such as “termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire.”205 Ledbetter
never claimed that any such discriminatory employment act occurred during
the 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge, including her denial of
a raise in 1998.206 The majority objected to Ledbetter’s attempt to impute
the alleged discriminatory intent associated with prior pay decisions to the
1998 decision.207 Allowing this transferring of intent would impose
liability without the presence of the essential element of discriminatory
intent.208 This would eliminate discriminatory intent as an element of a
disparate treatment claim.209 The majority did not remove this element, nor
would it circumvent the statutory limitation period chosen by Congress
when it enacted Title VII.210
The 180 day charging period required by Title VII serves a policy of
repose.211 It protects employers from having to defend against discrimination claims regarding decisions that were made in the past, perhaps after the
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
577-78).
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id. (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 578).
Id. at 2168 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257).
Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906).
Id. at 2169 (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 906; Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257; Evans, 431 U.S. at
Id.
Id. (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110-11, 114 (2002)).
Id.
Id. at 2170.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5-(e)(1) (2000)).
Id. (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-55 (1974)).
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departure of those that made the decisions.212 The discriminatory intent
element of a disparate pay claim makes timely filing all the more crucial.213
The intent of the employer will often, if not always, be the most disputed
element of the claim.214 Evidence of intent is likely to disappear quickly as
witnesses become unavailable and memories fade.215 The majority asserted
that Congress intentionally chose a short deadline, and the Court will give
deference to this legislative decision.216 The fact that Congress chose such
a short deadline refuted Ledbetter’s argument that the doctrine of laches
provides proper protection to employers.217 Congress did not force
employers to rely on this doctrine, but instead instituted a short deadline for
the filing of claims.218
The majority held that Evans, Ricks, Lorance, and Morgan controlled.219 The Ledbetter Court rejected Ledbetter’s assertion that an
employment practice committed with no improper purpose and no discriminatory intent is still unlawful because it gives some effect to an intentional
discriminatory act that occurred before the charging period.220 The majority
ruled that Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim was untimely for these reasons.221
The majority then turned to Ledbetter’s argument that Bazemore v. Friday
is controlling and that the “paycheck accrual rule” should be used in this
case.222
2. Pay Decisions Are Not to Be Treated Differently Than Other
Employment Decisions
Ledbetter argued that Bazemore, not Evans, Ricks, and Lorance should
be controlling in this case and that pay decisions should be treated differently than other employment decisions.223 She argued that the Bazemore
Court held that each paycheck begins a new EEOC charging period that
allows any prior discriminatory conduct that affected the amount of the

212. Id. (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980)).
213. Id. at 2171.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 2170.
217. Id. at 2171.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2172.
220. Id. (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002); Int’l Union of Elec., Radio, &
Machine Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 236 (1976)).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986)).
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paycheck to be challenged.224 This is called the “paycheck accrual rule.”225
However, the majority disagreed with this interpretation.226 According to
the majority, Bazemore is inapposite to this case because it dealt with an
amendment to Title VII.227 In 1972, Title VII was made applicable to public employees, like the plaintiffs in Bazemore.228 Justice Brennan, in his
concurring opinion, asserted that pre-1972 acts of discrimination that were
perpetuated after 1972 could be challenged.229 Bazemore dealt with a
discriminatory pay structure.230 Thus, each paycheck issued under a
discriminatory pay structure constitutes a new Title VII violation with its
own EEOC charging period.231 Ledbetter’s situation is different than the
plaintiffs’ in Bazemore.232 Ledbetter did not claim that Goodyear ever
instituted a discriminatory pay structure.233 She only argued that particular
Goodyear employees discriminated against her individually, but those
alleged incidents took place outside of the EEOC charging period.234
According to the majority, Bazemore did not support Ledbetter’s claim.235
The majority then turned to Justice Ginsburg’s contention that Ledbetter’s
pay discrimination claim should be treated differently than other disparate
impact claims.236
In contrast with the majority’s reasoning, Justice Ginsburg asserted in
her dissent that Ledbetter’s disparate pay claim did not deal with a discrete
act of discrimination, but with a hostile work environment.237 Morgan
stated that a discrete act of discrimination is one that “constitutes a separate
actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’ and that is temporally distinct.”238 Discrete acts include termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, or refusal to hire.239 A hostile work environment is comprised of a
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 391). This amendment allowed government
employees to file employment discrimination claims following the same procedures as employees
of private companies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2000).
229. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2173 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
230. Id. at 2172 (citing Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 397 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
231. Id. at 2174.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2175.
237. Id. at 2181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 2175 (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)).
239. Id. (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114).
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number of harassing acts which may not be actionable individually.240 A
hostile work environment does not occur on any specific day.241 The
majority objected to this characterization of Ledbetter’s claim, however,
pointing out that she asserted a claim against each paycheck she received
during the EEOC charging period as a discrete discriminatory act.242 The
majority rejected what it claimed to be Justice Ginsburg’s attempt to create
a special rule for pay discrimination claims such as Ledbetter’s.243 Next,
the majority rejected Ledbetter’s remaining arguments for the “paycheck
accrual rule.”244
3. Analogies to Other Statutes and Policy Arguments Are
Insufficient to Support the “Paycheck Accrual Rule”
The EPA prohibits paying unequal wages for equal work on the basis
of sex.245 Ledbetter argued that because the EPA allows claims challenging
discriminatory acts outside the EEOC limitations period, the Court should
also allow such challenges under Title VII.246 The majority summarily
dismissed this argument, stating that the EPA and Title VII are not the
same.247 Particularly, the EPA does not require the filing of a charge with
an administrative agency, as Title VII does.248 The EPA also does not
require proof of intentional discrimination.249 The majority then considered
Ledbetter’s analogy to the FLSA.250
Ledbetter similarly argued that because the statute of limitations for
violations of FLSA’s minimum wage and overtime provisions begins to run
with each paycheck, so should the limitations period under Title VII.251
The majority dismissed this argument just as quickly as it dismissed the
EPA analogy.252 The majority explained that an FLSA minimum wage or
overtime claim does not require proof of discriminatory intent.253 The

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id. (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115-16).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2176.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 255(a) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
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majority took a more favorable view to Ledbetter’s analogy to the
NLRA.254
The NLRA bears more similarity to Title VII than the EPA or the
FLSA.255 Similar to Title VII, it requires the filing of a charge with an
administrative agency (the National Labor Relations Board).256 Because
the NLRA’s statute of limitations begins to run with each new paycheck,
Ledbetter argued that Title VII’s limitations period should be similarly
considered.257 However, the majority countered, the rule under NLRA is
similar to the rule under Title VII.258 Claimants under the NLRA cannot
challenge acts that took place prior to its six-month statute of limitations,
just as claimants under Title VII cannot challenge acts that took place prior
to the 180 day EEOC charging period.259 Ledbetter’s analogy to the NLRA
did not support her claim, similar to her analogies to the EPA and the
FLSA.260 The majority then confronted Ledbetter’s policy argument in
favor of the “paycheck accrual rule.”261
Ledbetter argued that plaintiffs asserting a claim of pay discrimination
should have more time to file a charge with the EEOC than that mandated
by the statute, because pay discrimination is more difficult to detect than
other forms of discrimination.262 The majority was not swayed by this
argument, however, and refused to address the issue.263 The majority found
no support for Ledbetter’s policy argument in statutes or case law.264 As
Justice Alito stated in the majority opinion: “We apply the statute as
written, and this means that any unlawful employment practice, including
those involving compensation, must be presented to the EEOC within the
period prescribed by statute.”265 Thus, the majority rejected Ledbetter’s
final argument.266
The Ledbetter Court deemed Ledbetter’s claim to be time-barred.267 It
found that an allegedly discriminatory act must be accompanied by
discriminatory intent, and Ledbetter conceded that the only pay decisions
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id. at 2177 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2000)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1960)).
Id. at 2166-67.
Id. at 2177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2172.
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that took place during the 180 day EEOC charging period were not coupled
with any discriminatory intent.268 The Court also refused to adopt the “paycheck accrual rule” and held that the discriminatory intent accompanying an
act outside the EEOC charging period cannot be carried forward and
attached to an act within the period.269 The majority rejected Ledbetter’s
analogies to other statutes and her policy arguments as well.270 The
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.271 The decision was split, however, with Justice
Ginsburg writing a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer.272
B. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENTING OPINION, JOINED BY JUSTICES
STEVENS, SOUTER, AND BREYER
Justice Ginsburg asserted that the majority erred in a number of
respects.273 First, the majority should not have rejected the “paycheck
accrual rule.”274 Second, the majority failed to recognize that pay discrimination is difficult to detect.275 Finally, it mistakenly relied on Evans, Ricks,
and Lorance as controlling precedent.276 Ginsburg first turned to the
question of what constitutes an unlawful employment practice under Title
VII.277
1.

Unlawful Employment Practices Under Title VII

Justice Ginsburg explained that in a pay discrimination claim, there are
a number of ways to define the crucial employment practice.278 One view
is that each wage-setting decision stands alone as a singular employment
practice.279 If this is the case, each wage-setting decision must be challenged within its own 180 day EEOC charging period.280 An alternative
view is that the wage-setting decision and the issuing of a paycheck with a
discriminatorily low wage are both potentially unlawful employment
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 2167.
Id. at 2167, 2172.
Id. at 2176-77.
Id. at 2178.
Id.
Id. at 2179 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2181-82.
Id. at 2183-84.
Id. at 2179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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practices.281 Under this view, each paycheck would be actionable, with its
own 180 day charging period.282 While prior discriminatory wage-setting
decisions would not be actionable in and of themselves, they would be
relevant in any claim related to the issuing of a discriminatory paycheck.283
The majority followed the first view, but Justice Ginsburg contended that
the second view is “more faithful to precedent, more in tune with the
realities of the workplace, and more respectful of Title VII’s remedial
purpose.”284
a.

Categories of Unlawful Practices

Justice Ginsburg cited Bazemore as holding that paychecks based on
past discrimination are actionable not only because they are related to prior
discrimination, but because each paycheck is an instance of new discrimination.285 This view was refined in Morgan, where two categories of employment practices were defined: discrete acts and hostile work environments.286 Discrete acts, such as termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, or refusal to hire, occur on a specific date.287 An EEOC charge
must be filed within 180 days of the date on which the discrete act occurred
in order to challenge the act in court.288 A hostile work environment does
not occur on any particular day.289 The acts constituting a hostile work
environment can take place over an extended period of time and may not be
individually actionable.290 Justice Ginsburg asserted that the pay discrimination of the type suffered by Ledbetter is more similar to a hostile work
environment than a single discrete act of discrimination.291 Ledbetter
alleged, and the jury agreed, that a number of acts combined to result in the
receipt of a discriminatorily low wage when compared to her male counterparts.292 Also, the realities of the workplace make Ledbetter’s claim similar
to a hostile work environment claim.293

281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2180 (citing Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986)).
286. Id. (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110, 113-15 (2002)).
287. Id. (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114).
288. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110).
289. Id. (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2181.
292. Id. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 23, at 16-20 (describing the discriminatory acts suffered by Ledbetter).
293. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2181.
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The Realities of the Workplace

In a section of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent based more on practical
reality than statutes and precedent, she explained that the nature of the
workplace makes a pay discrimination claim more similar to a hostile work
environment claim than one of a discrete discriminatory act.294 Often, an
employee does not know that her pay is lower than that of her coworkers.295
This problem is exacerbated when, as in Ledbetter’s case, the employee that
is being discriminated against still receives raises, but the raises are lower
than those of her male counterparts.296 She has little reason to investigate
whether she has been discriminated against if she has received a raise.297 In
addition, even if an employee is aware of a discrepancy between her pay
and that of her coworkers, she may consider the amount not significant
enough to complain or file a charge.298
On the other hand, Justice Ginsburg asserted that an employee is fully
aware of a discrete discriminatory act when it occurs.299 An employee who
is fired or turned down for a promotion may immediately inquire into the
reasons behind the decision.300 If she thinks those decisions are accompanied by discriminatory intent, she can challenge the decisions, whether
through internal processes or the EEOC.301 Discrete acts of discrimination
are different from a hostile work environment not only in the experience of
the employee, but also in the effect on the employer.302
c.

The Benefits of Discrimination for Employers

Justice Ginsburg further asserted that employers benefit differently
from discrete acts of discrimination than they do from recurring pay
discrimination.303 When an employer chooses to hire a man instead of a
woman, a position is still filled with an employee to whom a salary must be
paid, and benefits must possibly be given, for example.304 The same is true
when a man is promoted or transferred instead of a woman.305 However,

294.
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298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2181.
Id.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(2)(a)(1), 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000)).
Id. at 2182.
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when an employer intentionally pays a woman less than a man because of
her sex, the business benefits by saving money on wages.306 Because of
these differences, Justice Ginsburg stated that a pay discrimination claim
such as Ledbetter’s should not be treated as a discrete act of discrimination.307 Accordingly, the precedent on which the majority relies is
inapposite.308
2. The Majority’s Reliance on Evans, Ricks, and Lorance is
Unsound
The majority relied heavily on Evans, Ricks, and Lorance to assert the
point that an EEOC charge needs to be filed within 180 days of when the
discriminatory act takes place, not when its effects are felt.309 Justice
Ginsburg contended, however, that these cases are inapposite.310 Evans did
not object to being forced to resign until four years later, when her seniority
credit was denied.311 Ricks did not object to the denial of his tenure until
one year later, when his terminal contract ended.312 These were easily
identifiable singular acts of discrimination; not recurring, continuous
discriminatory situations as in Ledbetter.313 Justice Ginsburg explained that
Lorance is similarly inapplicable because its facts are dissimilar to
Ledbetter, and it has been largely overruled through legislation.314
The Lorance Court held that the adoption of the discriminatory
seniority system was a discrete act of discrimination that had to be challenged within the EEOC charging period.315 In that sense, it is different
from the recurring, hostile work environment-style discrimination of
Ledbetter, and therefore distinguishable.316 Justice Ginsburg also stated
that the majority’s reliance on Lorance is “perplexing,” since that decision
was superseded by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.317 Congress followed the
Lorance dissenters and amended Title VII to state that an actionable discriminatory employment act occurs when a discriminatory seniority system
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 2167-69 (citing Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 906 (1989); Del.
State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555,
559 (1977)).
310. Id. at 2182.
311. Id. (citing Evans, 431 U.S. at 554-57).
312. Id. (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 253-54, 257-58).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 2183 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000); Lorance, 490 U.S. at 902, 905).
315. Id. (citing Lorance, 490 U.S. at 914).
316. Id.
317. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000)).
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is adopted, when someone becomes subject to that system, and when
someone is injured by that system.318 Lorance’s lack of precedential value
is clarified by the fact that the Supreme Court had not, until Ledbetter,
relied on it since the adoption of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.319 Thus, not
only is the majority’s reasoning based on inapplicable precedent, it also
defies the intent behind Title VII, according to Justice Ginsburg.320
3.

Title VII’s Backpay Provision

Justice Ginsburg asserted that Congress never intended for the 180 day
EEOC charging period to limit the employment acts that could be considered.321 Title VII allows damages to include backpay for a period of up
to two years prior to the date that the charge is filed.322 According to
Justice Ginsburg, this provision shows that Congress contemplated challenges to pay discrimination that began before the 180 day charging
period.323 As the Morgan Court stated:
If Congress intended to limit liability to conduct occurring in the
period within which the party must file the charge, it seems unlikely that Congress would have allowed recovery for two years of
backpay. And the fact that Congress expressly limited the amount
of recoverable damages elsewhere to a particular time period
indicates that the timely filing provision was not meant to serve as
a specific limitation either on damages or the conduct that may be
considered for the purposes of one actionable hostile work
environment claim.324
According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court should not have “immunize[d]
forever discriminatory pay differentials unchallenged within 180 days of
their adoption.”325 Justice Ginsburg next turned to the concerns of employers defending against claims of gender-based pay discrimination.326

318.
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Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000)).
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Protections for Employers

Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority’s assertion that its
decision was necessary to protect employers from the need to defend
against claims of pay discrimination based on decisions made long ago.327
The discrimination suffered by Ledbetter did not take place long ago.328
She suffered discrimination each time she received a lower paycheck
because of her gender.329 Also, there are many defenses employers can use
in response to these claims.330 Employers that are disadvantaged by a delay
in bringing a claim can assert the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and
equitable tolling.331 Moreover, the equitable doctrine of laches may help
employers.332 Justice Ginsburg also took issue with the majority’s assertion
that she would allow a pay discrimination claim based on a decision made
twenty years ago.333 No reasonable judge would allow that claim, according to Justice Ginsburg.334 In addition, an adequate defense against such a
claim would be provided to any of the above-mentioned doctrines.335
Finally, Justice Ginsburg looked at the simple facts to show how the
majority had come to a decision in opposition to Title VII’s remedial
purpose.336
5.

Ledbetter Proved That She Had Suffered Discrimination

Justice Ginsburg reiterated that at trial, Ledbetter proved that she was a
member of a protected class, that she had performed work equal to her male
coworkers, that she had been paid less for that work, and that the pay
disparity was due to gender-based discrimination.337 Ledbetter showed that
she had suffered a long history of discrimination.338 She also introduced
evidence to show that discrimination against women was pervasive at the
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331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
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337.
338.

Id. at 2170, 2185.
Id. at 2185.
Id. at 2185-86.
Id. at 2186.
Id. (citing Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002)).
Id.
Id. at 2175, 2186.
Id. at 2186.
Id.
Id. at 2187.
Id.
Id.
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Gadsden, Alabama Goodyear plant.339 However, according to the majority,
Title VII provides no remedy for this discrimination.340 Ledbetter had to
challenge each and every pay decision within 180 days of when it was
made.341 It is not unlawful to knowingly carry forward past discrimination.342 Ledbetter could not receive any compensation for her discriminatorily low pay, nor could she—if she were still employed by Goodyear—
receive an injunction forcing the company to stop discriminating against
her.343 Justice Ginsburg asserted that this result is contrary to Congress’s
intent to enact protection against workplace discrimination through Title
VII.344 For this reason and those described above, Justice Ginsburg would
have reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and held that Ledbetter’s claim was not time-barred.345
IV. IMPACT
Justice Ginsburg foreshadowed the impact of this decision when she
asserted, “[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress’ court. As in 1991, the
Legislature may act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title
VII.”346 Although the decision has received a somewhat favorable reaction
in the lower courts,347 it appears that Congress is acting to reverse the
Ledbetter Court’s ruling.348
A. POSITIVE REACTION FROM LOWER COURTS
The Court’s decision in Ledbetter has been followed in decisions by
courts in the Second,349 Third,350 Fifth,351 Sixth,352 Seventh,353 Ninth,354

339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 2187-88.
343. Id. at 2188.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See, e.g., Plant v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., 07 Civ. 3498 (AKH), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55100, at *5-10 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007) (holding that a claim of a continuing violation of
Title VII is untenable after Ledbetter). But see Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. C 06-04000
MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67791, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (explaining that Ledbetter merely
classified discriminatory pay decisions as discrete acts, as opposed to a hostile work environment).
348. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (proposing to
codify the paycheck accrual rule).
349. See, e.g., Plant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55100, at *5-10 (rejecting a claim of a
continuing violation of Title VII).
350. See, e.g., Mikula v. Allegheny County of Pa., No. 06cv1630, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70510, at *7-9 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2007) (rejecting a Title VII claim because the EEOC charge
was filed too late).
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Tenth,355 and Eleventh 356 Circuits. Ledbetter has been cited for three reasons.357 First, Ledbetter has been cited for its distinction between discrete
acts of discrimination and continuing acts of discrimination.358 Courts have
used Ledbetter to reject claims of violations of Title VII that cannot be
fixed at one point in time.359 Second, Ledbetter has been cited for the
proposition that nondiscriminatory employment acts do not violate Title
VII, even if they put into effect discriminatory acts outside of the EEOC
charging period.360 Plaintiffs have not been allowed to carry forward past
discriminatory intent to a later employment act.361 This has also been
phrased as a rejection of the “paycheck accrual rule,” which contends that
each paycheck that is lower because of a past discriminatory act is actionable under Title VII.362 Third, the Ledbetter decision has been used to bar
claims of employment discrimination because charges were not timely
filed.363 In addition to these three implications of Ledbetter, the decision
has also affected how gender-based discrimination claims are made.364

351. See, e.g., Smith v. Murphy & Sons, Inc., No. 2:06cv79, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64063,
at *29 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 28, 2007) (considering a claim under the Equal Pay Act because the Title
VII claim was time-barred).
352. See, e.g., Algie v. N. Ky. Univ., No. 06-23-JGW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53347, at *1319 (E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007) (granting summary judgment because no discriminatory acts took
place during the EEOC charging period).
353. See, e.g., Groesch v. City of Springfield, No. 04-3162, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50009, at
*6-11 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2007) (rejecting the “paycheck accrual rule”).
354. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 245 Fed. App’x 600, 601-02 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding
to reconsider in light of Ledbetter).
355. See, e.g., Taher v. Wichita State Univ., No. 06-2132-KHV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
90728, at *34-35 (limiting plaintiff’s claim to a particular time period).
356. See, e.g., Dixon v. Winter, No. 3:05-cv-1153-J-33HTS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58539,
at *7-8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2007) (failing to consider a discrete act that took place outside of the
EEOC charging period).
357. Infra notes 358-62 and accompanying text.
358. See, e.g., Plant v. Deutsche Bank Secs., Inc., 07 Civ. 3498 (AKH), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55100, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007) (holding that a claim of a continuing violation of
Title VII is untenable after Ledbetter).
359. Id.
360. See, e.g., Garcia v. Brockway, 503 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting rehearing
en banc, and withdrawing opinion by Garcia v. Brockway, No. 05-35647, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 199
(9th Cir. Idaho, Jan. 7, 2008)).
361. Infra note 362 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., Groesch v. City of Springfield, No. 04-3162, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50009, at
*6-7 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2007) (rejecting the “paycheck accrual rule”).
363. See, e.g., Algie v. N. Ky. Univ., No. 06-23-JGW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53347, at *13
(E.D. Ky. July 23, 2007) (granting summary judgment because the claim was not timely filed).
364. Infra note 365 and accompanying text.

2008]

CASE COMMENT

327

B. A SHIFT FROM TITLE VII TO THE EQUAL PAY ACT
Ledbetter may have signaled a change in the significance of Title VII
as it relates to pay discrimination claims based on gender.365 In Smith v.
Murphy & Sons, Inc.,366 the District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi, after time-barring the plaintiff’s Title VII claim under
Ledbetter, still considered the claim under the EPA, which has a two year
statute of limitations.367 Justice Ginsburg foreshadowed this result in her
dissent, stating, “[I]n truncating the Title VII rule this Court announced in
Bazemore, the Court does not disarm female workers from achieving
redress for unequal pay, but it does impede racial and other minorities from
gaining similar relief,” because the EPA covers only gender-based discrimination.368 Thus, while Ledbetter may not preclude remedies for pay discrimination based on gender, it may have a negative effect on minorities
who cannot rely on the protection of the EPA.369
C. NEGATIVE REACTION FROM LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter has received negative
treatment from courts in the Second,370 Third,371 Sixth,372 Eighth,373
Ninth,374 and Tenth375 Circuits and the D.C. Circuit.376 Courts have not

365. See Smith v. Murphy & Sons, Inc., No. 2:06cv79, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64063, at *29
(N.D. Miss. Aug. 28, 2007) (considering a claim under the Equal Pay Act after the Title VII claim
was time-barred).
366. No. 04-3162, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64063 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 28, 2007).
367. Id. at *29.
368. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2186 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Osborn v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 05cv1673 (JBA), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 69996, at *26-27 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2007) (holding that Ledbetter is inapposite because
in this case, discriminatory acts took place during the EEOC charging period).
371. See, e.g., Mavrinac v. Emergency Med. Ass’n of Pittsburgh, No. 04-1880, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 73526, at *15 (W.D. Penn. Oct. 2, 2007) (explaining that the Ledbetter Court did not
address whether a Title VII claim could be salvaged by the doctrine of equitable tolling or the
discovery rule).
372. See, e.g., Dodd v. Dyke Indus., No. 3:04-cv-226-H, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78248, at
*13-14 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 19, 2007) (distinguishing Ledbetter because the plaintiff claimed that new
and discrete discriminatory acts took place each year).
373. See, e.g., Bearden v. Int’l Paper Co., No. 5:06cv0037, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69117, at
*32-33 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 2007) (considering the plaintiff’s claim only under the Equal Pay
Act).
374. See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Albertson’s, Inc., No. C06-0400 MHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67791, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007) (concluding that Ledbetter did not directly address the
equitable doctrine of continuing violations).
375. See, e.g., Proctor v. UPS, 502 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding Ledbetter
inapposite because it only dealt with discriminatory acts that took place outside the EEOC
charging period).
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refused to follow Ledbetter, but they have found opportunities to
distinguish it.377 The decision has been distinguished when plaintiffs make
pay discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act instead of Title VII.378
Ledbetter is inapplicable to claims that allege discriminatory acts within the
EEOC charging period.379 Ledbetter’s impact has also been limited by one
court that observed that the decision did not directly address the doctrine of
continuing violations; rather, it dealt with discrete acts of discrimination
whose effects were felt during the EEOC charging period.380 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Ledbetter may be limited even more greatly, however,
by congressional action.381
D. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT
On June 22, 2007, Representative George Miller (D-CA) introduced
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 in the House of Representatives.382
The bill has ninety-three cosponsors, including North Dakota’s Representative Earl Pomeroy (D-ND).383 The bill seeks to amend Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973.384 It most substantively amends Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act by adding the following provision:
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation
of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an
individual is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages,

376. See, e.g., George Wash. Univ. v. Violand, 932 A.2d 1109, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing Ledbetter because the university did not make a statute of limitations defense
against the pay discrimination claim).
377. Id.
378. See, e.g., Bearden, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69117, at *32-33 (considering the plaintiff’s
claim only under the Equal Pay Act).
379. Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1206-07.
380. Albertson’s, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67791, at *10-12.
381. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007) (proposing to
codify the paycheck accrual rule).
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
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benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in
part from such a decision or other practice.385
Thus, Congress is seeking to carry forward the discriminatory nature of
the wage-setting decision to the subsequent issuance of paychecks, something that the Ledbetter majority refused to do.386 When asked to respond
to this congressional action, Justice Alito, the author of the Ledbetter
majority opinion, explained that since the Court was just interpreting the
law Congress passed, “it’s certainly Congress’s prerogative” to change it.387
The bill passed the House by a vote of 225-199 and is awaiting action from
the Senate.388
E.

NORTH DAKOTA IMPACT

North Dakota’s employment discrimination laws differ from Title VII’s
restrictions, so the impact that Ledbetter will have on North Dakota is
unclear.389 North Dakota’s regulations on equal pay for men and women
are contained in North Dakota Century Code Section 34-06.1.390 The
prohibition of gender-based pay discrimination is set forth as follows:
No employer may discriminate between employees in the same
establishment on the basis of gender, by paying wages to any
employee in any occupation in this state at a rate less than the rate
at which the employer pays any employee of the opposite gender
for comparable work on jobs which have comparable requirements
relating to skill, effort, and responsibility. . . . No person may
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against any
employee in violation of this chapter. No employer may discharge
or discriminate against any employee by reason of any action
taken by the employee to invoke or assist in any manner the
enforcement of this chapter, except when proven that the act of the
employee is fraudulent.391
This chapter creates a private cause of action for employees that have
suffered discrimination.392 It also allows the Commissioner of Labor, by

385. Id.
386. Id.; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2007).
387. Robert Barnes, Newest Justice Tips High Court to Right; Alito Cast Key Votes in Major
5 to 4 Rulings on Abortion and Campaign Finance, WASH. POST, June 28, 2007, at A15.
388. 153 CONG. REC. H 9226 (2007).
389. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1 (2007) (prohibiting gender-based pay discrimination).
390. Id.
391. Id. § 34-06.1-03.
392. Id. § 34-06.1-05.
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written request of the employee, to sue on the employee’s behalf.393 The
Commissioner has other broad powers under this chapter, including the
ability to inspect records, examine witnesses, eliminate unlawful practices
“by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion,” supervise the payment of wages, and enact regulations.394 Violation of the
chapter is a class B misdemeanor, which brings maximum penalties of
thirty days in jail and a $1000 fine.395 The chapter does contain a time-limit
provision, but leaves a number of important questions unanswered.396
The statute of limitations mandates that court action commence within
two years of the claim for relief.397 It does not state how long an employee
may wait to file suit after she suffers gender-based pay discrimination.398 It
also does not answer the central question of Ledbetter: Can each paycheck
be challenged as discriminatory, or must each discriminatory wage-setting
decision be challenged within a certain period of time? 399 The North
Dakota Supreme Court did not answer this question in the only case in
which it considered North Dakota Century Code Section 34-06.1-03.400 In
Swenson v. Northern Crop Insurance, Inc.,401 the North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed a summary judgment order against a female employee on
her pay discrimination claim.402 The court only addressed this issue on procedural grounds, however, leaving questions about the timing and procedure of filing a claim unanswered.403 Thus, while a North Dakotan that has
been paid a discriminatorily low wage on the basis of his or her gender may
face a more difficult road asserting a claim under Title VII after the
Ledbetter decision, he or she may be able to achieve redress through the
state process by appealing to the protections contained in the North Dakota
Century Code.404
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394.
395.
396.
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399.
400.
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404.

Id.
Id. § 34-06.1-04(3).
Id. §§ 12.1-32-01, 34-06.1-09.
Id. § 34-06.1-06.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Swenson v. N. Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 178-80 (N.D. 1993).
498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993).
Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 180.
Id. at 179.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (2007).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Ledbetter, the United States Supreme Court ruled that issuing a paycheck based on prior discriminatory wage-setting decisions is not itself a
discriminatory employment act.405 The discriminatory intent behind a
previous action cannot be imputed to the nondiscriminatory issuing of a
paycheck.406 The Court also held that a claim of gender-based pay
discrimination under Title VII must be brought within 180 days of the
discriminatory wage-setting decision.407 A claim that is brought more than
180 days after the discriminatory wage-setting decision is untimely and the
courts can offer no relief.408
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